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Survey of Utah Strict Products Liability Law:
From Hahn to the Present and Beyond

According to the Utah Supreme Court, the notion of holding a manufacturer strictly liable for its defective products is
premised "on the proposition that the cost of injuries caused by
defective products . . . sold for profit should be considered a
cost of doing business to be borne by manufacturers . . . rather
than by the injured individuals."' The Utah court views strict
products liability as a doctrine that aligns the public interest i n
promoting the production of safer products with the individual's
interest in remaining free from injury caused by defective
goods.' If nothing else, then, a broad-based policy orientation
has guided the Utah court in its formulation of Utah strict
products liability law.
Notwithstanding its broad policy orientation, the Utah
court has not decided a substantial number of cases dealing
with strict products liability. In fact, since its 1979 adoption of
the Restatement's section 402A3 formulation of strict products
liability,* the Utah Supreme Court has heard relatively few
cases in which the doctrine of strict products liability was a
central issue. Still, the Utah court continues to affirm its longstanding adherence to section 402A, and there is little doubt
that section 402A remains the basic formulation of strict products liability law in Utah.5
This comment surveys the Utah Supreme Court's decisions
in the area of strict products liability law since its adoption of
section 402A in Hahn. In addition, this comment reviews the
impact several recent legislative enactments have on strict
products liability law in Utah. Section I outlines the basic ele-

1.
2.
3.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985).
Id.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS8 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
4.
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). For a
discussion of the Utah court's adoption of 8 402A in Hahn, see Lynn S. Davies,
Comment, Strict Products Liability in Utah Following Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Armco Steel Co., 1980 UTAHL. REV. 577.
5.
See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1991).
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ments of a section 402A cause of action and the various decisions of the Utah court that discuss and apply those elements.
Section I1 discusses the affmmative defenses to strict liability
actions that are recognized in Utah. Section I11 briefly discusses peripheral issues, including injuries to bystanders, statutes
of limitations, and injuries to real property, which are nevertheless important to an overview of Utah strict products liability law. Finally, because Utah is one of the relatively few jurisdictions that has not adopted some form of the second collision
doctrine, Section IV explores this "subset" of strict products
liability law and suggests the form of the doctrine that the
Utah court will ultimately adopt when provided with the opportunity to do so.

I. THE ELEMENTS
OF A SECTION402A CAUSEOF
ACTIONAND THEIRAPPLICATION
UNDERUTAHLAW
The specific language of section 402A provides that:
(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) i t is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which i t
is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1)applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or c,onsumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
~eller.~

In considering the implications and application of this section
in Utah, a review of the essential elements of a strict products
liability action is helpful because the Utah court appears unwilling to effectuate a wholesale adoption of section 402A7 or
its official comments. Through selective adoption of those comments, the court has left open opportunities to interpret the

6.

7.

RESTATEMENT,supra note 3, § 402A.
See Davies, supra note 4, at 579-80.
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section's language in ways that differ from those found in the
official comments themselves.' Furthermore, judges have substantial discretion in applying the comments because their language is not always p r e ~ i s e . ~

A. "One who sells"10
The language of section 402A extends strict products liability to anyone who sells a defective product that is unreasonably
dangerous t o a consumer." Hence, section 402A's language is
broad enough to extend liability t o several different entities or
individuals within a distribution chain as "sellers," and the
plaintiff is not limited to a product's manufacturer in seeking a
recovery pursuant to a strict products liability theory.12
The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
the question of who or what constitutes a "seller" for section
402A purposes, but there are indications that the court would
extend liability to the seller of a particular product even if the
seller was not the product's manufacturer. For example, the
court has specifically adopted the language of section 402A,13
and as noted above, the plain language of that section is broad
enough t o extend liability to a non-manufacturing seller. In
addition, the court has frequently used the terms "seller" or
"sold" in the strict liability context,'* and the court appears
willing to accept the full import of its language.15
8.
See Grundberg, 813 P.2d a t 92-95 (adopting the basic policy of comment k,
but dictating an alternative application of that comment).
9.
See, e.g., id. at 100-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority's interpretation and application of comment k).
lo. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, 8 402A(1).
11. Id. 8 402A(l)(a) cmt. f.
12.
Id.
13.
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979).
14.
See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 91-92 (Utah 1991) ("the seller of
such products"); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981)
("manufacturer or seller"); Hahn, 601 P.2d a t 158 ("defendant sold products").
15.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that, under certain circumstances,
retail sellers may seek i n d e d i c a t i o n from a defective product's manufacturer in
strict products liability actions.
In Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a
retail seller sought indemnification from an airplane's manufacturer for attorney's
fees, costs, and expenses that the retailer incurred in defending a strict products
liability action brought against the retailer, the manufacturer, and several others.
Id. at 444. Before trial, a settlement was reached between the Hanover plaintiff
and all of the named defendants. Id. a t 444-45. The retail seller paid no part of
the settlement, but the retailer sought indemnification from the airplane's manufacturer for the above-stated costs. Id. a t 445. The trial court granted summary judg-
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Finally, the Utah court has implicitly acknowledged that
non-manufacturing sellers can be held liable under a strict
products liability theory. In Raithaus u. Saab-Scandia of America, Inc.,16 the plaintiff brought a strict products liability action against the manufacturer of his automobile three and onehalf years after his wife was tragically killed when the car
caught fire. While the court focused its attention on the applicable statute of limitations,17 it made no suggestion that the
inclusion of either the vehicle's American distributor or the
local dealer as co-defendants in the cause of action was improper. Similarly, in Dowland u. Lyman Products for Shooters,18 a
plaintiff injured when the breech of a rifle he was shooting
exploded in his hand brought a products liability action against
the firearm distributing company that sold him the rifle. As in
Raithaus, the court did not address the appropriateness of
naming non-manufacturing sellers as defendants in actions
brought pursuant to a strict products liability theory,lg but
the court's silence on the matter indicates at least some implicit justification for holding non-manufacturing sellers liable.20

B. "engaged in the business of sellingd1
Section 402A also requires the seller to be "engaged in the
business of selling" the defective product.22 Comment f indicates that section 402A liability does not extend t o

ment in favor of the manufacturer. Id.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that in a strict
products liability action, a retail seller may seek equitable indemnification from a
product's manufacturer if (1) the retailer was free from wrongdoing; (2) the manufacturer was either an active wrongdoer or produced a defective product; and (3)
the manufacturer was given notice of the retailer's claim for indemnity. Id. a t 447.
Moreover, the retailer's claim for indemnification may extend to any judgment it is
required to pay, as well a s attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred in defending the suit. Id. at 446-47. Accordingly, because the manufadurer had clearly been
notified, the court remanded the action for further proceedings wherein the trial
court was to determine whether the manufacturer had produced a defective product, and whether the retail seller "was simply a n innocent 'passive' link in the
chain of commerce." Id. a t 450.
16.
784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989).
Id. a t 1160-62.
17.
18.
642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982).
19.
The issue before the court was improper admission of expert testimony. Id.
20.
See also UTAH CODEA N N . § 78-15-6(1) (1992) ("sold by the manufacturer or
other initial seller").
21.
RESTATEMENT,supra note 3, § 402A(1).
22.
Id. § 402A(l)(a).

UTAH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
the occasional seller of food or other such products who is not
engaged in that activity as part of his business. Thus it does
not apply t o the housewife who, on one occasion, sells . . . a
jar of jam . . . . [or] to the owner of an automobile who, on one
occasion, sells it to his neighbor.23

The Utah court has never published a decision addressing
strict products liability wherein the factual pattern was anything but decisive as to this element in a section 402A cause of
action. As a result, the court has never addressed the proper
scope of this element as a matter of law.
For example, in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
C O . ? ~the court reviewed the evidence supporting the jury's
finding that the defendant manufacturer was strictly liable to
the plaintiff in light of the elements of a section 402A cause of
action. The court expressly found that there was "credible, substantial evidence in [the] record" supporting the jury's finding
that the defendant "engaged in the business of selling" the
defective product.25 Such language reinforces the argument
that the court accepts this element as a necessary part of a
section 402A cause of action. The facts of Hahn, however, decisively established that issue. There was simply no reason to
doubt that the manufacturer of the defective steel joists in
Hahn produced them with the intention of selling them to
others, and that it was "engaged," not only in the manufacturing business, but also in the "business of selling" its product.
However, because factual patterns may not always be so clearcut, and because the Utah court has not indicated what kind of
activity does or does not fall within the scope of the "engaged in
the business of selling" element, a definitive standard cannot
be arti~ulated.~"

23.
Id. $ 402A cmt. f.
24.
601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979).
25.
Id. at 158.
But see discussion infra part I.C. While the decision of the Utah Court of
26.
Appeals in Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is most
appropriately characterized as a decision defining the term "defective product," it is
a t least possible to view the court's decision as one finding that the defendant was
not "engaged in the business of selling" integrated cleaning systems. This interpretation of Conger indicates a rather strid reading of the "engaged in the business of
selling" element of a § 402A cause of action. Because the court of appeals did not
address the facts before it in those terms, however, this interpretation of Conger
would be a decidedly unstable platform upon which to build an entire argument.
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C. "any
Pursuant t o section 402A, the sale of "any product" sold in
a defective conhtion unreasonably dangerous t o a consumer or
the consumer's property can give rise to strict products liability." In light of the decisions reached by the Utah court, it
does not appear that the scope of this element is any narrower
for purposes of Utah law than the plain language of the section
indicates. The court has heard a number of cases wherein various types of products were either alleged, or actually found to
be, both defective and dangerous, and with the exception of a
limited exemption for prescription drugs, it has never indicated
that products within a particular category are exempt from
strict products liabilit~.~'
The notion of a "product" is not limitless however. In Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc.?' the plaintiff sued pursuant to a strict
products liability theory and argued that a manufacturer's
installation of non-defective "spray balls" in an integrated
cleaning system for a milk tanker without providing grit strips
along the top of the tank created an unreasonably dangerous
~ o n d i t i o nThe
. ~ ~ Utah Court of Appeals held that the negligent
installation of non-defective products does not give rise to strict
products liability.32The court agreed with the plaintiffs assertion that the failure t o install grit strips may have rendered
the tanker unreasonably dangerous, but in the court's view, it
did not cause the spray balls themselves to become defective.33

27.
RE~ATEMENT,
supra note 3, $ 402A(1).
28.
Id.
29.
See Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) (firearm);
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (prescription drug); Whitehead
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990) (automobile); Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (aircraft); Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981) (winch throttle control valve); Hahn, 601
P.2d at 152 (steel joists).
30.
798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Id. a t 281.
31.
Id. a t 283. In support of its position, the court cited a decision by the
32.
South Carolina Supreme Court, DeLoach v. Whitney, 273 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1981)
(refusing to extend strict liability to defendant who installed non-defective tire but
failed to install new valve stem or tell plaintiff that the old valve stem had deteriorated).
Conger, 798 P.2d a t 282 & n.3. The court made reference to both support33.
ing and contrary authority in drawing this conclusion. See Hoover v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 528 P.2d 76 (Or. 1974) (refusing to extend strict liability to defendant
who installed non-defective tire but failed to tighten the lug nuts when placing the
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Under Conger, then, it appears that providing installation
services in connection with the sale of a product does not, in
and of itself, fall within the rubric of "product" for purposes of
strict products liability. Of course, because the Utah Supreme
Court did not address the Conger fact pattern, its adoption of
the reasoning employed in Conger remains uncertain, as does
the court's willingness to apply similar reasoning in slightly
different factual settings.

D. "in a defective condition"B4
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized "three types of
product defects: manufacturing flaws, design defects, and inadequate warnings regarding use."35In Dowland v. Lyman Products for Sh0oters,3~the court stated that the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving a product defect in a strict products liability
cause of action and that the burden is met only upon a showing
that the product at issue had an unreasonably dangerous defect?' The court upheld a jury finding in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff had failed t o establish that the rifle
causing his injuries was dangerously defective upon the date it
While the plaintiffs expert established that
was deli~ered.~'
the rifle's breech was designed so that its construction created
a danger of explosion at pressures greater than 23,000 pounds
per square inch, his experts did not establish that pressures
even close t o that magnitude are produced when the appropriate powder is used.3g
In a later decision, the court characterized its decision in
Dowland as an application of, and adherence to, official comment g of section 402A.40However, because the standard articulated by the Dowland court does not specifically incorporate
all of the comment's requirements, the court's adoption of that
comment is less than straightforward. Comment g indicates

wheel on the hub and axle). But see Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 690 P.2d
1280 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant's failure to warn about the dangers of installing a used inner tube in a non-defective new tire could itself constitute a product defect).
34.
RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, 9 402A(1).
35.
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991).
36.
642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982).
37.
Id. at 381.
38.
Id. at 381-82.
39.
Id. at 381.
40.
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 91.
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that strict products liability extends
where the product is, a t the time it leaves the seller's hands,
in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is
not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition,
and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful
by the time i t is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the
hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff;
and unless evidence can be produced which will support the
conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
Safe condition a t the time of delivery by the seller will,
however, include proper packaging, necessary sterilization,
and other precautions required to permit the product to remain safe for a normal length of time when handled in a
normal manner.41

A careful reading of this passage indicates that the standard
set forth in comment g is twofold. In order for strict products
liability t o be extended to a particular defendant, the plaintiff
must first establish that the defendant's product contained a
defect unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. The Dowland
decision and the standard articulated by the court in that
decision clearly establish the Utah court's adoption of this first
requirement.*'
Comment g requires more however. Having established an
unreasonably dangerous product defect, the plaintiff must also
establish that the defective condition was present when the
product left the defendant seller's hands. While the Utah
court's adoption of this requirement is not as clear, the court's
affirmation of the jury's findings implies that the product must
be defective when it leaves the seller's handd3 This second
requirement has also been codified at section 78-15-6 of the
Utah Code:
In any action for damages for
injury, death, or property damage allegedly 'caused by a defect in a product:
(1)No product shall be considered to have a defect or to
be. in a defective condition, unless at the time the product

41.

RESI'ATEMENT,supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. g.

42.

See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
Set! supra text accompanying note 38.

43.

UTAH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller,
there was a defect or defective condition in the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."

Finally, there is some indication in Dowland that the Utah
court approves of the "mishandling" and "other causes" lam
guage of comment g as well.45While the court did not address
whether precautionary measures were provided or needed upon
delivery of the rifle, it did note that the defendant had introduced evidence suggesting that the plaintiff used a powder
with a far greater explosive charge than the rifle was designed
t o utilize.46In connection with its observation that normal use
of the rifle did not create an actual danger of explosion,"' the
court's reference to the defendant's evidence indicates the
court's willingness to accept evidence that the plaintiff was
mishandling the defendant's product and that the actual cause
of his injury was the use of an inappropriate powder. Thus, at
least implicitly, the court has accepted the "mishandling" and
"other causes" exceptions to strict products liability that comment g enunciates.

E. "unreasonably dangero~s'~'
The Utah Code provides a definition of "unreasonably dangerous" that essentially elaborates on a similar definition found
in official comment i. Section 78-15-6(2) of the Utah Code defines "unreasonably dangerous" as a
product [that] was dangerous to an extent beyond which
would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer,
consumer or user of that product in that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers
and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or
experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consu~ner.~~

UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-15-6(1) (1992) (emphasis added).
44.
See also RESTATEMENT,supra note 3, $ 40% cmt. h (indicating that a prod45.
uct is not defective if it is safe for "normal handling and consumption" and that a
seller is not liable for any injuries or damages if the consumer misuses a product
or handles it in an abnormal fashion). Available affirmative defenses are discussed
infia at section 11.
Dowland, 642 P.2d at 382.
46.
Id. at 381.
47.
RESTATEMENT,supra note 3, $ 40%(1).
48.
49.
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-15-6(2) (1992).

0
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This definition does more than elaborate, however, for the
language relating to the actual knowledge, experience, or training of a particular buyer, user, or consumer is not found in
comment i. This language suggests that Utah courts are required to make factual inquiries into the subjective abilities
and knowledge of a product's user when determining if a product is "unreasonably dangerous." Such an inquiry is not contemplated in section 402A or its accompanying comments; thus,
when presented with identical fact patterns, a court conducting
the additional inquiry suggested by the Utah statute may reach
a different conclusion than a court applying only the principles
enunciated in section 402A.
For example, assume that manufacturer Z sells product Y
t o consumers A and B. Assume also that under the Utah statute, Y contains a defect that is unreasonably dangerous to A,
an ordinary consumer, but not to B because of special knowledge, training, and experience that B possesses. Finally, assume that both A and B sustain identical injuries caused by a
defect in Y. Pursuant to section 402A, both A and B could recover from Z because a determination that the defect in Y is
unreasonably dangerous turns on an objective inquiry based
upon A, the ordinary consumer.
On the other hand, under the Utah statute, B could not
recover from Z pursuant to a strict products liability theory
because B's special knowledge, experience, and training would
lead to a finding that Y was not unreasonably dangerous to B.
Thus, B could not satisfy this essential element in a strict products liability claim. Whether the Utah Legislature actually
intended this result is not clear from the notes accompanying
the statute, but its language is certainly broad enough to support such an outcome. Until the Utah court has an opportunity
t o interpret the statute, however, the degree t o which Utah law
varies from that of other jurisdictions on this issue is unclear.

1. Plaintiffs special knowledge and involuntary encounters
with a defective condition
Interpreting Utah's statutory definition of "unreasonably
the Court of Appeals
dangerous" in Beacham v. ~ee-Norse,~'
for the Tenth Circuit found that the Utah statute "only lists

50.

714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983).
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factors to be considered in determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous."' The plaintiff in Beacham lost four
of his fingers when he instinctively reached out to break a fall
and grabbed a piece of machinery a t its "pinch point."52Defendants argued that the trial court's exclusion of evidence showing that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the pinch point and
special training was erroneous because that evidence tended to
show that the machinery was not "unreasonably dangerous."53
The Beacham court found that other evidence before the jury
was sufficient to establish plaintiffs actual knowledge of the
danger, and accordingly, it concluded that the exclusion of additional evidence was not unduly prej~dicial.~~
The court also indicated that Utah's statutory definition
was not necessarily applicable where, as in Beacham, the plaintiff encountered the danger involuntarily.55The court stated
that
[wfiere a user encounters the defect involuntarily because a
safety device was not provided, evidence of his actual knowledge, training, or experience is of only limited value: 'We
have difficulty seeing how the knowledge of the dangerousness can alleviate the dangerous condition inasmuch as the
performance by plaintiff of his assigned tasks subjected him
to injury regardless of the care exerci~ed."~~

Thus, at least in situations where the plaintiff involuntarily
encounters a defective condition, there is some case law supporting the position that his actual knowledge, training, or
experience regarding that condition is of little weight in determining whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" pursuant to the Utah statute.57
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1012-13.
53.
Id. at 1015.
54.
Id. at 1016.
55.
Id. (the Beacham plaintiff was an employee in a coal mining operation).
56.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481, 485 (10th Cir.
1975)). It should be noted that the Beacham court's language was overly broad. At
least in some sense, all consumers injured by a defective product "encounter[] the
defect because a safety device was not provided." Id. Thus, if the court's language
was given full effect, Utah's statutory definition of "unreasonably dangerous" would
be rendered a nullity.
57.
But see Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279, 282 n.4 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (listing assumption of risk as a defense to strict products liability and fmding that employee who used cleaning system after recognizing danger assumed risk
of continued use).
51.
52.
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2. What constitutes adequate directions or warnings?
Comment j indicates that a seller may be required to provide directions or warnings in order to avoid a finding that its
product is unreasonably dangerous.58 As noted earlier, the
Utah court views "inadequate warnings about a product's use"
and a manufacturer who "knows or
as a product defect:'
should know of a risk associated with its product . . . is directly
liable to the [user] if it fails to adequately warn . . . of [the]
danger."60However, while these statements clearly establish a
duty to warn, the court has not articulated any standards as to
what actually constitutes a n adequate warning.
The language of comment j suggests that directions or
warnings are adequate if a consumer can safely use a product
by following those warnings or direction^.^' Because the adequacy of a warning is largely a factual inquiry that turns on
the specific attributes of a particular product, the Utah court
will probably adopt a similar generalized standard if ever confronted with the issue. Likewise, the Utah court will probably
adopt a related rule that there is no duty to warn when the
danger or potentiality of danger is generally known and recognized, or when the product is dangerous only if excessively
used or used over a long period of time.62
3. Unavoidably unsafe products

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the "basic policy" of
official comment k "as the law to be applied" in the state of
Utah." Comment k states that
[tlhere are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use . . . . Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, i s not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous . . . .
The seller of such products . . . is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, $ 40% cmt. j.
Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991).
Id. at 97.
RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, $ 40% cmt. j.
Id.
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92.
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apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.64

As examples of "unavoidably unsafe products," comment k lists
vaccines and experimental drugs, and it is in the prescription
drug context that the Utah court addressed the unavoidably
unsafe product exception.
In Grundberg, the plaintiff argued that she had "shot [and
killed] her mother as a result of ingesting the drug Halcion, a
prescription drug manufactured by [the] defendant Upjohn t o
treat ins~mnia."~In considering the application of comment
k, the court noted that its express terms only excepted unavoidably unsafe products to the extent that they were allegedly
defective in their design? If the seller of an unavoidably unsafe product mismanufactured its product or failed to provide
adequate warnings for its use, it could still be held strictly
liable notwithstanding the fact that its product could not be
designed so as to possess a greater degree of safety.67The
court stated that "[tlhis limitation on the scope of comment k
immunity is universally re~ognized."~~
The court then went on to decide how comment k should be
applied when a design defect is clearly alleged and considered
several different approaches that have been followed in other
jurisdi~tions.~~
These approaches can essentially be divided
into two major groups. One approach requires the trial court t o
make a case-by-case determination of whether a product is
unavoidably unsafe, either as a matter of fact, or by utilizing
some form of riskhenefit analysis.70A second approach was
adopted by the California Supreme Court in Brown u. Superior
Court," wherein the court extended comment k immunity to
all prescription drugs as a matter of law and thereby overRESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. k.
64.
65.
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90.
66.
Id. at 92.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. (citations omitted).
69.
Id. at 92-95.
See, eg., Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 305-06 (Idaho 1987), cert.
70.
denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988) (case-bycase riskhenefit analysis: not unavoidably
unsafe if any feasible alternative design would accomplish same purpose with less
risk); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990) (case-bycase as
a matter of fad); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781-82
(R.I. 1988) (case-bycase riskhenefit analysis: if reasonable minds could differ, then
send to jury; if not, directed verdict as to comment k immunity).
71.
751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
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turned a previous decision to apply a riskhenefit analysis on a
case-by-case basis.
After reviewing the two alternatives, the Utah court opted
for the second.72 Unlike the court in Brown, however, the
Utah court did not find that the language of comment k supports the position that all prescription drugs are unavoidably
unsafe products. The court recognized that "by characterizing
all FDA-approved prescription medications as 'unavoidably
unsafe,' [it was] expanding the literal interpretation of comment k."73 Nevertheless, the court found that policy justifications and the FDA's elaborate regulatory scheme for drug approval and distribution justified its holding.74 In addition, the
court noted that the Utah Legislature had extended special
protection to FDA-approved drugs and indicated that compliance with applicable government standards a t the time a product is marketed raises a rebuttable presumption that a product
is not defective.75
Finally, the Grundberg court expressed its view that the
FDA approval process was a better forum for utilizing a
riskhenefit analysis than a trial court." While the court said
it did not believe "that courts [were] unsuited to address design
defect claims in any product liability action,"77it found that
[iln light of the strong public interest in the availability and
affordability of prescription medications, the extensive regulatory system of the FDA, and the avenues of recovery still

72.
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95.
Id. at 90.
73.
74.
Id. a t 94-98. In support of its position, the court cited, a s policy justifications, society's substantial need for and the unique benefit of prescription drugs,
the increased cost and curtailment of drug development that would result from
greater liability, and the extensive screening mechanisms, careful scrutiny, premarket review, and post-market surveillance employed by the FDA. But see Barson
v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984) (FDA standards are
minimums-even aRer FDA requirements are met, liability may extend if manufacturer knew or should have known about dangers).
75.
Grundberg, 813 P.2d a t 97. The Utah Code provides that "punitive damages
may not be awarded if a drug causing the claimant's harm: (a) received premarket
approval or licensure by the [FDA] . . . ." UTAH CODEANN. § 78-18-2(1) (1992).
The Utah Code also provides that a rebuttable presumption that a product is nondefective arises "where the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product
were in conformity with government standards established for that industry which
were in existence at [that] time." UTAH CODEANN. 8 78-15-6(3) (1992).
76.
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 98-99.
Id. a t 98.
77.
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available to plaintiffs by claiming inadequate warning,
mismanufacture, improper marketing, or misrepresenting
information to the FDA. . . a broad grant of immunity from

strict liability claims based on design defects should be extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs in ~ t a h . ~ ~

Thus, the court concluded that "a drug approved by the [FDA],
properly prepared, compounded, packaged, and distributed,
cannot a s a matter of law be 'defective' in the absence of proof
of inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent information furnished by the manufacturer in connection with FDA approval."79

F. "to the user or consumer or to his property's0
The Restatement does not require a plaintiff to be in contractual privity with the defendant or to have purchased the
product in order to bring a strict products liability cause of
action." Furthermore, the Restatement provides that a user
may be only passively enjoying or working upon a product in
order to state a claim.82While the Utah court has not specifically addressed this issue, its decisions do not suggest that the
class of potential plaintiffs in s t r i d products liability actions is
any narrower than the Restatement's language indi~ates.'~
The Utah decisions also indicate that recovery is available
for damage to property. In fact, the decision wherein the Utah
court adopted the section 402A formulation of strict products
liability was an action to recover property damages?* However, the language of section 402A indicates that recovery can
only be obtained for "physical harm . . . caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property."85 Thus, whether a plaintiff may recover under a strict products liability theory for
economic injuries alone, or economic injuries in connection with
damages to the plaintfls person or property, remains a n open
question in ~ t a h . "
Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
Id. at 90.
RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, $ 402A(1).
RESATEMENT,supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. 1.
Id.
See, e.g., Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah
passenger in vehicle); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah
employee of purchaser).
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979).
RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, $ 402A(1) (emphasis added).
See W.R.H.,
Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42, 43-46 (Utah
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While the Utah court's adoption of section 402A results in
the extension of liability to a manufacturer of a defective product without regard to the manufacturer's fault, the court has
carefully pointed out that strict products liability does not render manufacturers absolutely liable.87A manufacturer is not
an insurer of its product and the product's use.88
The Utah Supreme Court has formally recognized two
affirmative defenses that a defendant may assert in a strict
products liability action.89First, the defendant may argue that
the user or consumer misused the produ~t.~'
Second, the defendant may argue that the user or consumer unreasonably
used the product "despite knowledge of the defect and awareness of the danger."g1
In the Utah court's view, these affmative defenses do not
completely bar plaintiffs recovery-even if the plaintiffs fault
exceeded that of the defendant'^.'^ The Mulherin court stated

1981) (allowing plaintiff to recover for economic injuries associated with damage to
property pursuant t o a negligence theory, but expressly leaving open the question
of Ywlhether or not a manufacturer should be held to a standard of strict liability
for economic losses resulting from the failure of [its] product to fulfill the commercial needs of the purchaser").
The court noted several jurisdictions that had denied recovery for economic
damages in strict products liability actions. See State ex. rel. Western Seed Prod.
Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969);
Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976), superseded by statute a s stated in
Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1205-06 (Wash.
1989).
87.
Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981).
88.
Id.
Id. a t 1302-03. For a discussion of the Utah court's adoption of comparative
89.
principles in the strict products liability setting, see Jeff L. Mangum, Note, The
Merger of Comparative Fault Principles with Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 964; Mark E. Wilkey, Comment, Mulherin
v. Ingersoll: Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability Cases,
1982 UTAHL. REV. 461.
90.
Mulherin, 628 P.2d a t 1303.
91.
Id.; see also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158
(Utah 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS$ 402A cmts. g & n (1965),
in support of these defenses); Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279, 282 n.4
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (listing assumption of risk as a defense to strict products
liability and finding that employee who used cleaning system after recognizing
danger assumed risk of continued use).
92.
Mulherin, 628 P.2d a t 1303-04.
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that circumstances "where the faults of both plaintiff and defendant . . . unite[] as concurrent proximate causes of an injury . . . [,I both faults should be considered by the trier of fact in
determining the relative burden each should bear for the injury
they have caused."g3 Thus, even if a plaintiffs misuse of a
product is responsible for 95% of the injury, the plaintiff could
still sue the product's manufacturer in a strict products liability
cause of action. While this result differs decidedly from that
allowed by the Utah comparative negligence statute effective a t
the time Mulherin was decided, the court expressly found that
statute inapplicable to the facts before it.94
Subsequent to Mulherin, however, the Utah Legislature
rewrote the statutes governing the application of "comparative
negligence." Section 78-27-38 of the Utah Code provides that
the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However,
no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.95

Initially, it should be emphasized that this statute is a comparative fault statute, not a comparative negligence statute as its
title indicates. Moreover, because the definition section defines
the term "fault" very broadly, this statutory language expands
the scope of available affrmative defenses beyond that implicated in a narrowly tailored comparative negligence statute. At
the same time, the statute's language eliminates a defendant's
liability when the fault of the plaintiff exceeds that of the defendant.
Section 78-27-37(2) defines "fault" as "any actionable . . .
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing t o injury
or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including,
but not limited to . . . contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, strict liability, . . . products liability, and misuse, modifi-

93.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1303-04 (citing UTAHCODEANN. 8 78-27-37 (1953) (barring recovery
94.
when defendant's negligence does not exceed plaintiffs, but applying onIy to neglisupra note 3, § 402A cmt. n (user or congence actions)); see also RESTATEMENT,
sumer barred from recovery if aware of danger but proceeds unreasonably to make
use of product).
UTAHCODEANN. § 78-27-38 (1992).
95.

*
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cation or abuse of a produ~t."'~
Hence, the same comparative
fault principles appear to govern whether the plaintiffs cause
of action sounds in negligence or strict products liability. If the
degree of fault attributed to a defendant for manufacturing a
defective product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer is
not greater than the degree of fault attributed to a plaintiff
who has misused that product, then the plaintiff cannot recover
damages for the injury. This directly contradicts the Utah
court's position in Mulherin and represents a change in Utah
law.
Furthermore, while the court has expressly recognized the
two affirmative defenses to strict liability discussed above,
nothing in the statutory language prohibits a defendant in a
strict products liability action from asserting the defense of
contributory negligence as well. While the Utah court has not
specifically addressed this issue in the context of a strict products liability action, it has done so with regard to the Utah
drarnshop statute.
In Reeves v. Gentile:' the court stated that "[tlhe fact that
the dramshop statute is a strict liability statute does not preclude comparison of the negligence of the intoxicated person
and of the person seeking recovery."g8 The court then reasoned that given a factual pattern where the plaintiffs negligence was greater than that of the intoxicated driver, holding
the dramshop defendant liable for the full amount of damages
"would subvert the intent and purpose of the comparative negligence statute" and would constitute absolute rather than
strict liability." At the same time, however, the court stated
that "comparative negligence does not have application to
dramshop defendants."lw These statements can be reconciled
if the defendant's culpability is considered apart from the issue
of causation.
To establish a defendant's culpability in a strict products
liability cause of action, the plaintiff need only show that the
defendant engaged in the particular activity that gives rise to
96.
UTAHCODEANN. 8 78-27-37(2) (1992).
97.
813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991).
Id. at 117.
98.
Id. (the court had previously asserted that the purpose of the comparative
99.
negligence statute was to limit recovery in proportion to the fault of the person
seeking recovery).
Id. at 116 (several of the dramshop defendants sought a finding of compar100.
ative fault among themselves).
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strict liability-that the defendant acted negligently, purposefully or with extreme malice is irrelevant. Thus, because the
defendant is strictly liable, there is no need to assess the relative degree of fault attributable t o the plaintiff or defendant,
and comparative negligence is consequently inapplicable for
culpability purposes.
On the other hand, the comparative negligence of the
plaintiff is very relevant when considering whether the
defendant's actions caused the plaintiffs injuries. It is entirely
possible for a defendant's actions t o render him culpable under
a strict liability theory, but at the same time, contribute only
marginally to the actual injury of the plaintiff. To allow the
plaintiff a full recovery from the defendant in such a situation
would render the defendant absolutely liable and a virtual
insurer of the plaintiffs actions. The Utah Supreme Court was
unwilling to accept absolute liability with regard to the
dramshop act in Reeves, and given the similar purpose underlying strict products liability law, the court is unlikely t o impose
absolute liability on a defendant in a strict products liability
action.lo'
In sum, while Mulherin extends the use of comparative
principles t o strict products liability actions through the a i r mative defenses of misuse or unreasonable use of a product,
the Utah comparative negligence statutes provide a court with
a potential avenue for allowing the defense of comparative
negligence in strict products liability actions as well.lo2While
this would not necessarily signal a dramatic departure from
prior common law precedent, it does potentially expand the
number of available defenses.'03
101. See id. a t 117 (citing statutory language and purpose in support of extending contributory negligence defense).
It should be noted that "[tlhe failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute
102.
contributory or comparative negligence, and may not be introduced a s evidence in
any civil litigation on the issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of damages." UTAH CODEANN. $ 41-6-186 (19%). The Utah Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion in Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah
1990), but the court did hold that for purposes of establishing the safety of a
vehicle's design, evidence that seatbelts were provided is admissible. Id. a t 927-28.
103.
Section 78-15-5 of the Utah Code also bears directly on the affirmative
defense of comparative fault in strict products liability actions. That section provides that for the purposes of evaluating the comparative fault of the plaintiff,
fault shall include a n alteration or modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the manufacturer or seller to the initial
user or consumer, and which changed the purpose, use, hnction, design,
or intended use or manner of use of the product from that for which the
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111. OTHERCONSIDERATIONS
A. Injuries to Casual Bystanders,
Non-consumers,Non-users and Others
Comment o indicates that casual bystanders and others
injured by a defective product who are not "users or consumers"
have not been allowed t o recover against a seller pursuant to a
strict liability theory? While comment o neither supports
nor criticizes this position, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that
non-user plaintiffs may sue pursuant to a strict products liability theory in some settings.
In Julander v. Ford Motor Co.,lo5the plaintiffs were injured when their car collided with a Ford Bronco.'06 The
plaintiffs brought a strict products liability action against Ford,
alleging that the accident was caused by defects in the Bronco's
design that caused the driver t o lose control of his vehicle.lo7
Ford argued that non-users of a product could not bring an
action for strict products liability, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed.lo8The court stated that "the post-Restatement evolution" of strict products liability law persuaded it to allow the
plaintiffs in Julander to proceed under such a theory of recovery.log
While the court's decision in Julander certainly indicates

product was originally designed, tested, or intended.
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-15-5 (1992). While similar language can be found in 8 7827-37(2), the above quoted section sets forth the standards in greater detail.
The Tenth Circuit indicated that a previous version of this statute required
'some sort of physical alteration or modification of the product itself which leaves
the product in a different condition or form than i t was in when it left the
manufacturer's . . . hand." Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.
1983). Accordingly, the Bemham court held that the elevation of a "roof bolter" on
crib blocks did not constitute an "alteration or modification" for purposes of the
statute. Id. Moreover, in the event i t did, the alteration was not a "substantial
contributing cause of the injury." Id. The "substantial contributing cause" standard
is no longer relevant. The current language of 8 78-15-5 substituted '[flor purposes
of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include" for '[nlo manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable for any injury . . . sustained a s a result of an alleged def e d . . . in the use or misuse of that product, where a substantial contributing
cause of the injury, death, or damage to property was."
104. RESI'ATEMENT,
supra note 3, 8 402A ant. o.
105. 488 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973) (interpreting Utah law).
1
Id. a t 841.
107. Id.
108. Id. a t 8 4 5 .
109. Id.
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an expansion of the class of plaintiffs able to sue pursuant to a
strict products liability theory, the Tenth Circuit did not articulate any reason for its conclusion that Utah should follow the
move towards expanded liability and adopt the position it articulated. Accordingly, because the Utah Supreme Court has not
had an opportunity to either specifically address the question
or adopt the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, strict products liability
law on this issue remains uncertain.

B. Further Processing and Component Parts
The Utah court has yet to directly confront a factual pattern wherein a manufacturer's product undergoes further processing or other change before reaching the ultimate consumer,
or where the manufacturer's product is a component part in a
larger product. Comment p of section 402A indicates that "[tlhe
question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for
discovery and prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to
the intermediate party who is to make the change^.""^ Taking no official position, the comment suggests that the outcome
of such inquiries will ultimately turn on the varied factual scenarios presented to the court. Accordingly, until the Utah court
addresses these issues, it is difficult to determine what direction Utah law will take.

C. Statute of Limitations
In Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,"' the plaintiff was injured when a pistol he was carrying discharged inadvertently
after falling out of its holster and landing on the running board
of the plaintiffs truck. Several months prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff learned that he might
have a cause of action against the manufacturer due to manuplaintiff filed his action
facturing defects in the pistol.""he
two days after the statute of limitations period had expired.ll3 The Utah Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations in a strict products liability action begins t o run on
the date of injury, and that the discovery rule is inapplicable
when the plaintiff learns of a possible cause of action prior t o

110.
111.
112.
113.

supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. p.
RESTATEMENT,
823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992).

Id.
Id.
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the expiration of the statute of limitation^."^
While Atwood is a recent decision, the statute of limitations interpreted by the court in that case no longer governs
strict products liability actions. Because the action in Atwood
was filed in October of 1988 and the injury occurred some four
years prior to that date, it was governed by section 78-12-25(3),
a catch-all statute of limitations for actions "for relief not otherwise provided for by law."l15 As of April 24, 1989, however, a
new statute of limitations for products liability actions became
effective.l16 Section 78-15-3 states that a "civil action under
[the Product Liability Act] shall be brought within two years
from the time the individual who would be the claimant in
such action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence would
have discovered, both the harm and its cause." Because section
78-15-3 contains language indicating that a plaintiff must be
aware of both the harm and cause, the applicability of Atwood
in future strict products liability actions may be limited.ll'

D. Real Property
In Loueland v. Orem City Corp.,l18 the plaintiffs argued
that residential developers should be held strictly liable for
The
deficiencies in real estate the plaintiffs had pur~hased."~
court stated that "[allthough such a theory has some appeal
from a risk-spreading standpoint and because of the obvious
reliance house buyers place on developer expertise," strict products liability should not be extended to real estate transactions. 120

IV. SECOND
COLLISIONS,
ENHANCED
INJURIES,
AND CRASHWORTHINESS
"Second collisions," "enhanced injuries," and "crashworthiness"'" are buzzwords associated with a legal doctrine that
114.
Id. at 1064-65.
115.
UTAHCODEANN. $ 78-12-25(3) (1992).
Id. $ 78-15-3 (1992).
116.
117.
Previous versions of the Product Liability Act contained a six-year statute
of repose. As a result, the Utah Supreme Court declared the A d unconstitutional
in light of the Utah Constitution's open court provision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). See also Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America,
784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989) (declaring the six-year time period a statute of repose).
118.
746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987).
119.
Id. a t 770-71.
Id. at 770.
120.
121.
Where possible, I will utilize the term "second collision doctrine" to refer to
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results in the extension of liability for design or manufacturing
defects that do not cause an accident, but nevertheless increase
the severity of a plaintiffs injuries when an accident occurs.'= Enhanced injuries are generally sustained when a design defect causes a second collision, a structural defect fails t o
protect a plaintiff in a reasonably foreseeable accident, o r when
a design defect is incorporated in the surface or object with
which the plaintiff collides in a second c~llision.'~~
The second collision doctrine originated in Larsen v. Genera l Motors Corp.,la an Eighth Circuit decision upon which
courts rely for the proposition that plaintiffs should recover for
enhanced injuries caused by a defective design.125Obviously,
all courts adopting Larsen agree with this fundamental proposition. These courts also agree, at least ostensibly, on two important corollaries of the second collision doctrine:
First, because the allegedly defective product played no role
in causing the plaintiffs initial accident, the manufacturer
can be held liable only for enhanced or aggravated injuries
that would not have occurred absent the alleged defect in the
product, and cannot be held liable for injuries attributable to
the initial collision. Second, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the alleged defect caused the enhanced injuries. 126

However, courts adopting the second collision doctrine do not
agree on what constitutes adequate proof that a defective product caused an enhanced injury.ln More precisely, they differ
on which party bears the burden of apportioning the respective
injuries among the first and second collisions.
In deciding this question, courts are confronted with two

this doctrine.
See, e g . , Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa.
122.
1990); James 0.Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of
Injuries Resulting from "Second Collision," 9 A.L.R. 4TH 494 (1981). While the
second collision doctrine is most commonly applied in cases involving some kind of
vehicle, it is not necessarily restricted to that application. See Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986) (unsafe design of hardhat gave rise
to products liability for enhanced injuries incurred when tree fell on logger's head).
123.
Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintifs Burden of Proving Enhanced
Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DEPAULL. REV.
55, 57 (1989); see also Pearson, supra note 122, at 497-98.
124.
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
125.
Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 60-61.
Id. at 62.
126.
Id.
127.
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important considerations. First, there is a problem of proof.
Second collision cases often involve complex patterns of causation that are very difficult to trace. Moreover, the underlying
theory of second collision cases is to impose liability upon a
manufacturer only for those injuries that are actually enhanced, or injuries that are over and above what the injured
party would have received absent the design defects. Analytically, such a theory requires "proof" of what would have occurred absent the defect. Thus, in order to apportion the injuries between a first and second collision, one party or the other
must "prove" a hypothesis that has no basis in the occurrence's
actual facts. Courts are naturally uncomfortable with that kind
of speculation-and some simply declare that "proving" such
matters is impossible.lB
Second, there is the need to strike a balance between important public policies that are often a t odds with one another
in the second collision context. On the one hand, courts want to
protect consumers from enhanced injuries actually caused by
defective products; on the other, courts want to avoid the imposition of absolute liability for a product's use on its manufacturer. Where a court decides to strike the balance dictates the
emphasis, and ultimately the outcome, of its opinion-both as
to the policy considerations and as to the problem of proof. As a
result, courts adopting the second collision doctrine apply it in
two fundamentally different ways, neither commanding a clear
majority. lZ9

A. Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Apportioning
Damages Between the First and Second Collision
One approach to the application of the second collision
doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "sole factor" approach.lsO The "sole factor'' approach requires a plaintiff to
prove that the enhanced injuries sustained in a second collision
were caused by a defective condition in the applicable product.13' In order to do so, the plaintiff must establish what injuries would have been received absent the design defect, and
show that the defective product was the sole factor contributing

128.
See Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 788 (10th Cir. 1978).
In application, there is actually a range among the levels of proof required.
129.
See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 62 n.35.
Id.
130.
131.
Id.
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to the enhanced injuries sustained. Stated differently, the
plaintiff bears the burden of apportioning the injuries to the
first and second collision and proving those injuries that are actually enhanced injuries.'32
The jurisdictions adopting this approach generally employ
reasoning similar to that of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Huddell u. Levin.'" In Huddell, the driver of a
Chevrolet Nova was killed when his car was hit from behind
after running out of gas on the Delaware Memorial Bridge.'"
While most of his other injuries were superficial, the driver's
skull was extensively fractured when his head struck the head-

132.
For example, in Harvey ex rel. Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d
1343 (10th Cir. 1989), the plaintiff established that he was injured when he was
ejected from his car during a rollover, but he did not establish that the injuries he
sustained "were over and above those which would have been sustained had the TTop [on his car] remained in place and had [he] remained inside the vehicle." Id.
a t 1350. The jury found that the plaintiffs car was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to the plaintiff, and that the defective condition was a proximate cause of his injuries. Id. a t 1346 n.1. The jury also found that the plaintiff
and the defendant were each 50% a t fault, and that the fault of each was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. Id. Notwithstanding these findings, however, the
jury did not award any damages to the plaintiff. Id.
On his motion for a new trial and later on appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the jury's failure to award any damages was inconsistent with its findings of multiple liability and proximate causation against the defendant. Id. a t 1346. The
Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that the jury's failure to award damages was "consistent with the proposition that the plaintiff did not establish the
extent of enhanced injuries, if any, attributable to the defective design of the T-Top
on [plaintiff's car]." Id. at 1351. In other words, because the plaintiff offered no
evidence that his ejection from the car resulted in injuries of greater severity than
he would have sustained had he remained in the car during the accident, the jury
was not able to determine what plaintiffs enhanced injuries actually were. Because
under Wyoming law plaintiff bears the burden of establishing such injuries, and
because the defendant is only liable for those injuries that are actually enhanced
injuries, the jury's award of zero damages was all the plaintiffs proof could sustain.
For other examples of decisions adopting some formulation of this position, see
Chretien v. General Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opinion), available in LEXIS & Westlaw databases (holding that plaintiff had burden of
proof, but declining to decide if "crashworthiness" cause of action existed in Virginia); Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law that it had previously interpreted); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649
F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying Colorado law); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law); Huddell v. Levin, 537
F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (interpreting New Jersey law); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk
AG, 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 162 (N.J.
1991); Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986).
537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
133.
134. Id. at 732.
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rest after impact.ls5 The driver's estate brought a diversity
action for enhanced injuries against General Motors Corporation pursuant to a strict liability theory, arguing that the headrest was defective in design because "its relatively sharp edge
of unyielding metal allowed for excessive concentration of forces
against the rear of [the driver's]
The jury found that
the headrest was defective and that it was a substantial contributing factor in the driver's death.'" Accordingly, the jury
awarded a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant in excess of two million dollar^.'^'
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff must
prove three specific elements in an enhanced injury cause of
action:
First, in establishing that the design in question was defective, the plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative, safer
design, practicable under the circumstances . . . . Second, the
plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries, if any, would have
resulted had the alternative, safer design been used. . . .
Third, as a corollary to the second aspect of proof, the plaintiff must offer some method of establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design.ls9

As to the first element, the court noted that the plaintiff had
offered sufficient proof to submit the issue of defective design to
the jury and sustained its finding that the headrest was defective.140 As to the second and third elements, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had established that the accident would have been "survivable" absent the defective design,
but that alone was insufficient apportionment of the injuries
between the first and second collision.141"It was not established whether the hypothetical victim of the survivable crash
would have sustained no injuries, temporary injuries, permanent but insignificant injuries, extensive and permanent injuries, or, possibly, paraplegia or quadriplegia."'42 For this and

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 735.
at 732.
at 737-38.
at 736.
at 738.
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other reasons, the court ordered a new trial.143
In support of its allocation of the burden of proof, the Third
Circuit stated that while the driver of the car striking
Huddell's car may be liable for all injuries arising out of the
accident, the theory underlying the enhanced injury doctrine
dictates that General Motors is only liable for those injuries
that are actually enhanced injuries?
Analogies to concurrent actions combining to cause a single
impact are simply not applicable. Similarly, analogies to
chain collisions are not applicable, where, as [in Huddell], one
party is sued on a fault theory for the collision and the other
party is sued on the theory of strict liability for the "second

other words, because " '[slecond collision' cases do not implicate 'clearly established double fault' for the same occurr e n ~ e , " 'the
~ ~ court simply did not believe that traditional t o r t
theories relating t o accidents involving concurrent proximate
causes of a single collision should govern enhanced injury cases. 147
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
indivisibility of Huddell's death precluded General Motors from
attempting to divide responsibility and limit its liability.148
While noting that the New Jersey Death By Wrongful Act statute treated death as an indivisible injury, the court pointed out
that it is the plaintiff who suggests divisibility by arguing the
enhanced injury theory.149In fact, the "apportionment. . .
contemplated [in a second collision case] is not a division
among the injuries that the plaintiff sustained, but rather the
difference between the injuries actually incurred and the injuries that would have resulted in the collision in the absence of
the alleged defect."l5' That being the case, the court was simI

143. Id. at 731.
144. Id. at 738.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The court also reasoned that while the plaintiff should bear the burden of
apportioning the injuries, the plaintiffs failure to do so would not excuse all
wrongdoers. Id. at 738-39."Should plaintiff fail to meet her burden on this claim,
the brute fact is that the negligent driver would not escape liability on the same
ground." Id. at 739.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at $4.
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ply unwilling to "accept the proposition that suing for wrongful
death suffices to convert limited, second collision, enhanced
injuries liability into plenary liability for the entire consequences of an accident which the automobile manufacturer played no
part in precipitating."l5l
In sum, pursuant to the "sole factoryyapproach, the
plaintiffs burden of establishing causation is not met unless
the plaintiff can prove injuries resulting from the second collision over and above those which would have been received
absent the defective condition. In the event the injuries are
actually indivisible, the plaintiff will be unable to meet this
burden of proof and the cause of action against the product's
manufacturer will fail. While this may be a difficult burden to
meet, the jurisdictions adopting this approach view it as analytically consistent with the enhanced injury theory and the
generally accepted notion that manufacturers should not be
held to a standard of absolute liability.

B. Defendant Bears the Burden of Apportioning
Damages Between the First and Second Collision
Another approach to the application of the second collision
doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "substantial factoryy
approach152and, like the "sole factor" approach, also requires a
plaintiff' to prove that the enhanced injuries sustained in a
second collision were caused by a defective condition in the
applicable product. However, the "substantial factoryyapproach
does not require the plaintiff to establish what injuries would
have been sustained absent the defect. A plaintiff need only
establish that the defective product was a substantial factor
contributing to the injury.153After the plaintiff establishes
that the injuries were caused by a defective product, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to apportion the injuries
resulting from the first and second collisions.'"

Hudckll, 537 F.2d at 739.
151.
Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 69-70.
152.
153. Id. at 70.
For example, in Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P.2d 1020 (Idaho Ct.
154.
App. 1982), a f d , 692 P.2d 345 (Idaho 1984), the plaintiff was injured when he
drove his car a t 55 miles per hour into the back of a parked car. Id. a t 1022.
Plaintiff sued pursuant to a strict products liability theory and argued that his
injuries were enhanced as a result of a defective seat belt and energy-absorbing
steering column. Id. at 1021. After the plaintiff presented his evidence, the trial
court held that the plaintiff "had failed to make a prima facie case for en-
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Jurisdictions adopting this approach generally look t o the
for
~ guidTenth Circuit's decision in Fox u. Ford Motor C O . ' ~
ance. In Fox, two passengers in the rear seat of a Ford Thunderbird were killed when the car in which they were riding was
struck head-on by another vehi~le.'~?J?he
plaintiffs brought a
strict liability action against Ford Motor Co., alleging that both
women sustained enhanced injuries because of defective seat
belts and passenger compartment padding.'57 The jury found
that the car was defective and that the defects were the proximate cause of death.'58 Accordingly, the jury awarded a judgment of $650,000 in favor of the plaintiffs.15'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Wyoming would
adopt the enhanced injury doctrine if presented with the question,160 and then considered the application of that doctrine.
The Tenth Circuit stated that the duty t o prove enhanced damages is generally a "part of the plaintiffs responsibility to prove
proximate cause, that is, that the defendant in such a case is
liable only for those damages which are within the orbit of risk

hancement of injuries" because he "had not proven what his injuries would have
been if the seat belt and steering column had functioned properly." Id. a t 1023.
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that
[i]f the defects are shown to be a substantial factor, then the burden of
proving apportionment falls on the defendants. Where no apportionment is
established, the plaintiff is entitled to recover fully from any defendant
whose defective product was a substantial factor in producing the injuries.
However, where the injuries are apportioned, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover only for injuries in excess of those which probably would have
occurred absent the defects.
Id. at 1024-25. The court then went on to find that, although the plaintiff had
failed to specifically establish a causal c o ~ e c t i o nbetween his injuries and the
alleged defects in his car, he had presented sufficient evidence to support a legitimate inference that a causal relationship existed. Id. at 1025. Accordingly, he met
his burden of establishing a prima facie case, and the trial court's directed verdict
was reversed. Id. a t 1025-26.
For other examples of decisions adopting this approach, see Mitchell v.
Volkswagenwerk AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law); Fox
v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (interpreting Wyoming law); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985); Lahocki v. Contee
Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd on 0 t h grounds, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. Ct. App. 1980); Blankenship v. General Motors Corp.,
406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991).
155.
575 F.2d a t 774.
156.
Id. at 777.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 788.
159.
Id. at 777.
160.
Id. at 781.
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created by him."'" Nevertheless, unlike the Third Circuit in
Huddell, the Tenth Circuit could not
see any difference between [an enhanced injury] case and the
other case in which two parties, one passive, the other active,
cooperate in the production of a n injury. Each one's contribution in a causal sense must be established. Damages may be
apportioned between the two causes if there are distinct
harms or a reasonable basis for determining the causes of
injury. 162

Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit adopted a different position
with regard to the divisibility of death. In the court's view,
death "is not a &visible injury in which apportionment is either
appropriate or po~sible."'~~
The court stated that the Third
Circuit's position in Huddell failed "to recognize that [a] wrongful death [action] is different from [a] cause of action for injuries, which has different elements and a different measure of
damages such as pain and ~uffering."'~~
Finally, because it considered the apportionment issue
irrelevant, the court approved the trial court's unwillingness to
provide jury instructions on enhanced injuries and apportionment of damages between the first collision and defective design.
[Tlhe jury had found Ford liable for the deaths and thus there
was little basis for contending that apportionment continued
to be relevant. There is no evidence in the record, in any
event, a s to how much damage the collision produced assuming the decedents survived, but i t is not only an impossible
question to answer, i t is a moot one, since Ford was adjudicated to have caused the deaths which produced the damages
for which suit was brought. Since the damages were limited
to those allowed under the wrongful death act and Ford was
responsible for the deaths and the damages related to the
deaths, no apportionment problem remained.

In other words, the Tenth Circuit held that the proof offered by
the plaintiffs establishing that the car's defects were the prox-

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

a t 787.
(citations omitted).
a t 787-88.
a t 788.
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imate cause of death, and that the women would have survived
absent those defects, was sufficient to impose liability upon the
defendant.
In short, pursuant to the "substantial factor" approach, a
plaintiff satisfies the burden of proving causation if the plaintiff shows that the defective product was a substantial factor
contributing to the injury. Once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, the defendant manufacturer is treated as a
concurrent tortfeasor and is held jointly and severally liable.
The defendant manufacturer may then attempt to limit its
liability by apportioning divisible injuries between the first and
second collisions. In the event the injuries are not divisible, the
manufacturer is jointly and severally liable for the total
injury-liability that is essentially absolute.
C. Predicting the Future: Which Approach Will Utah Adopt?
The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
the second collision doctrine; thus, articulating a definitive rule
of law for the State of Utah is impossible. There is little reason
to doubt, however, that the Utah court will adopt the doctrine
in some form or another. When Larsen v. General Motors
Corp.lQ was decided, a line of authority originating in the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Evans v. General Motors Corp.
essentially held that a manufacturer does not have a responsibility to foresee collisions in designing and building its
product. l" Since Larsen, however, the.jurisdictions which embrace the Evans reasoning are becoming increasingly few in
number.'?' Still, assuming that the Utah court will adopt
some form of the second collision doctrine, the particular approach the court will take in applying that doctrine remains to
be seen.
An initial question that the Utah court will face in the
enhanced injury context is whether application of the enhanced
injury doctrine is appropriate in strict products liability actions
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
167.
359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), overruled, Huff v.
168.
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
169.
Id. at 824.
170.
See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 61 nn.32-33 (noting only two
jurisdictions adopting Evans since Larsen (however, those two have now adopted
Larsen as well, see Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va.
1991)), and listing 35 states and the District of Columbia as having affirmatively
adopted Larsen).
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or in negligence actions alone. While many jurisdictions apply
the enhanced injury doctrine in the negligence context, some
courts are hesitant t o extend it to a strict liability
setting-particularly if they are not required t o do so.171
Other courts view the enhanced injury doctrine as a particular
species of products liability law17' and never concern themselves with the appropriateness of extending liability for enhanced injuries in the strict products liability context.
As t o the Utah court's treatment of this issue, it should be
noted that the broad-based policy justifications underlying its
extension of strict products liability in other areas are certainly
broad enough to support the extension of such liability pursuant to an enhanced injury theory of recovery. Holding a product's manufacturer strictly liable for enhanced injuries caused
by its products is certainly consistent with the "proposition that
the cost of injuries caused by defective products" should be
borne by the manufacturer profiting from their ~a1e.l'~
Likewise, liability for enhanced injuries promotes both the "production of safer products" and the public's interest in avoiding
injuries "caused by defective goods."'" Given this policy orientation, the Utah court will probably have little difficulty in
applying both the enhanced injury doctrine and strict products
liability within a single conceptual framework.
The more difficult question, of course, is where to place the
burden of proof for the enhanced injuries. Which party will
bear the burden of apportioning the injuries t o the first and
second collision and proving those injuries that are actually
over and above what the plaintiff would have received absent
the defective product? As stated earlier, the jurisdictions adopting the second collision doctrine split on this issue. The Utah
Supreme Court, however, is likely to place that burden upon
the plaintiff.
In jurisdictions requiring the defendant t o apportion the
injuries, the defendant in a second collision case is viewed as a

171.
See Fox v. Ford Motor Corp., 575 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1978) (deciding
it was unnecessary to determine whether strict liability applied to enhanced injury
cases); Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503 n.5, 506 (stating that the duty in enhanced injury
cases "should and can rest, at this time, on general negligence principles," and
leaving the decisions as to strict liability open for states to decide on their own).
See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir. 1991); Gen172.
eral Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1181 (Ma. 1985).
173.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985).
Id.
174.
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concurrent tortfeasor. So long as the defects are a substantial
factor contributing to the plaintiffs injuries, the manufacturer
is liable for those injuries that its defective product caused. If
the injuries the plaintiff receives are indivisible, then the manufacturer is held jointly and severally liable for the unfortunate
consequences of the entire accident.lT5
This result is flatly inconsistent with the Utah comparative
negligence statute, particularly in light of the fact that many
second collisions are initiated by first collisions resulting from
the negligent or reckless behavior of the party seeking recovery. Utah's comparative negligence statute provides that "no
defendant is liable t o any person seeking recovery for any
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that
defendant."176In other words, there is no joint and several
liability for actions covered by that section. Moreover, because
the section applies to any person seeking recovery, and because
"a person seeking recovery" is defined as anyone "seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on the behalf of
another,"lT7it would clearly be applicable in an action for
damages resulting from enhanced injuries caused by a defective
product.lT8
Holding a manufacturer jointly and severally liable in an
enhanced injury case involving indivisible injuries also violates
the Utah court's position that manufacturers are not subject t o
absolute products liability.17gConsidering the court's predis-

175. See discussion supra part 1V.B.
176. UTAHCODEANN. 78-27-38 (1992).
177. Id. $ 78-27-37(3).
178. Id. $ 78-27-38. In fact, the Utah statutes governing comparative fault suggest that some form of the second collision doctrine may already be present in
Utah law. The statutes define fault as any "act, or omission proximately causing or
contributing to" a plaintiffs injury. UTAHCODEANN. $ 78-27-37(2) (1992) (emphasis
added). The term "contributing" could be construed to include the enhancement of
a particular injury. Accordingly, a plaintiff would only need to establish that a
defective product "contributed" to her injury for the apportionment of fault to become an issue appropriate for jury deliberation. While apportioning fault is semantically different from apportioning injuries between first and second collisions, it
probably makes little substantive difference. Because the party who must apportion
fault would likely need to apportion injuries between the first and second collision
to establish that a product defect was or was not a factor "contributing" to the
user's injuries, the central issue is essentially the same. Hence, unless the court
construes the term "contributing" so broadly that the defective product's manufacturer is liable simply because the product was somehow within the chain of causation, it will ultimately still be required to decide who bears the apportionment
burden.
179. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981); see
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position against requiring a product's manufacturer to function
as a virtual insurer of the product and its use,lsOit is unlikely that the court would extend absolute liability in the enhanced injury setting.
Finally, the policy arguments advanced in support of the
"substantial factor" approach are not likely to be persuasive
enough to draw the Utah court away from its established policy
orientation. For example, in adopting the "substantial factor"
approach, the Idaho Court of Appeals pointed out that the
defendants in Larsen had opposed the enhanced injury doctrine
because apportioning the damages between a first and second
collision is difficult.181The court then noted language from
Larsen, wherein the Eighth Circuit said:
"This is no persuasive answer and, even if difficult, there is
no reason to abandon the injured party to his dismal fate as a
tr&c statistic, when the manufacturer owed, at least, a common law duty of reasonable care in the design and construction of its product. The obstacles of apportionment are not
in surmountable."lg2

The Idaho Court of Appeals does not explain, however, why
this quote from Larsen requires the surmountable burden of
apportionment to fall upon the defendant; nor does the court
offer any policy justification for extending what amounts t o
absolute liability to defendant manufacturers when the injury
is indivisible.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, second collision cases involve the apportionment between the injuries actually sustained and those that would have resulted absent the defect,
not the apportionment of injuries actually received by the injured party.183A plaintiff upon whom the burden of apportionment falls in a second collision case is not required to divide an indivisible injury such as death; what the plaintiff is
required to do is offer some evidence that establishes what
injuries would have been received absent the design defect.

also Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 117 Wtah 1991) (refusing to disallow comparative negligence defense in dramshop case because it would result in absolute liability of dramshop defendants).
180. Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1302. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
181.
Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Idaho Ct. App.
1982), affd, 692 P.2d 345 (Idaho 1984).
Id. (quoting Larsm, 391 F.2d at 503).
182.
183.
Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 84.

11731

UTAH STFtICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

1207

While this suggests "proof" of a counter-factual hypothetical, it
would be no less counter-factual if the defendant were required
to "prove" it. In addition, absolute proof and precise detail as t o
the injuries is not required; the plaintiff need only establish the
alternative injuries by a preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, given the policy orientation evidenced in recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and the likelihood that it will
adopt the second collision doctrine in some form, the court will
probably place the burden of apportioning injuries between the
first and second collision squarely upon the plaintiff. However,
it is possible that the Utah court will choose an alternative
application, especially when one considers the substantial split
of authority on the issue and the lack of any binding precedent
to guide the court.

As noted at the outset, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the strict products liability theory found in section 402A as
the basic formulation of strict products liability law in Utah.
For the most part, then, Utah strict products liability law essentially reflects the law from other jurisdictions adopting the
section 402A formulation. In the absence of a contrary Utah
decision that is directly on point, counsel should be be relatively safe in arguing the majority rule as set forth in the official
comments accompanying section 402A.
There are, however, some variations and elaborations of
section 402A in Utah law that should be particularly noted.
First, pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc.,la negligent installation of a non-defective product does not give rise to strict products liability in
Utah.lS5 Second, section 78-5-6(2) of the Utah Code appears
to require factual inquiries into the subjective abilities and
knowledge of a product's user in determining if the product is
unreasonably dangerous. Third, pursuant to the unavoidably
unsafe exception, the Utah Supreme Court has extended a
blanket exemption from strict products liability for design defects in prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug
Administration. Finally, the comparative fault principles extended to strict products liability actions through the Utah

184.
185.

798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Id. at 281-83.
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court's decision in Mulherin u. Ingersoll-Rand Co.lS6and section 78-27-38 of the Utah Code may provide for defenses or
immunities from strict products liability not recognized in other
jurisdictions.
Additionally, while the Utah court is likely to adopt some
form of the second collision doctrine, just how it will apply that
doctrine is uncertain. Nevertheless, in light of the policy orientation exhibited in its recent decisions, the Utah court is most
likely to place the burden of apportioning the damages between
the first and second collision upon the plaintiff in a strict products liability action.

Robert A. McConnell

186.

628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981).

